Insiders can artificially deflect the market prices of financial instruments from their full-information or "inside" value by issuing deceptive accounting reports. Incentive support for disinformational activity comes through forms of compensation that allow corporate insiders to profit extravagantly from temporary boosts in a firm's accounting condition or performance. In principle, outside auditing firms and other watchdog institutions help outside investors to identify and ignore disinformation. In practice, accountants can and do earn substantial profits from credentialling loophole-ridden measurement principles that conceal adverse developments from outside stakeholders. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act now requires top corporate officials to affirm the essential economic accuracy of any data their firms publish, officials of outside auditing firms are not obliged to express every reservation they may have about the fundamental accuracy of the reports they audit. This asymmetry in obligations permits auditing firms to continue to be compensated for knowingly and willfully employing valuation and itemization rules that generate misleading reports without fully exposing themselves to penalties their clients face for hiding adverse information. It is ironic that what are called accounting "ethics" fail to embrace the profession's common-law duty of assuring the economic meaningfulness of the statements that clients pay it to endorse.
2 profitability by concealing unfavorable information, and watchdog information agents are often fooled or persuaded to cooperate in the concealment.
An unremitting flood of accounting scams, Ponzi schemes, and corporate scandals leads each new Congress to consider stronger controls on corporate wrongdoing.
Congress becomes involved because, when managers or watchdog information professionals shirk their duties or act dishonestly, consequences accrue not only to corporate stakeholders, but also to society at large. This paper traces a major part of the problem to the flawed ethics of the accounting profession. By designing and certifying reporting options that help troubled firms and rogue managers to conceal adverse information from outside stakeholders, the highly concentrated accounting industry manages to insulate from serious sanctions the rents it can earn from cleverly abetting deceitful behavior.
Our analysis stresses the weakness of social controls on interactions between the governance systems that prevail within corporations and the ethical codes of accountants and other external watchdog institutions. Although parties to acts of negligent misrepresentation and fraud are subject to civil and criminal penalties, difficulties in identifying, preventing, and punishing corrupt exchanges of value between managers and accountants make it distressingly easy for these parties to conspire against trustful outside stakeholders.
The more effectively the ethical norms, accounting standards, and corporate laws of a given country control misrepresentation and questionable side payments, the more reliable its financial information promises to be. Despite the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, U.S. accounting rules remain riddled with safe-harbor loopholes.
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A rule contains a safe-harbor loophole when it softens or eliminates an accountant's civil liability for incompetence or negligence so long as the accountant complies with procedures identified in the rule. Absent evidence of malicious or fraudulent intent, auditors need only confirm that approved procedures were followed, without having to statistically test the information against independent empirical evidence (e.g., from derivatives markets 1 ) or to express suspicions they may hold about the accuracy of the information being transmitted. Standard-setting agents value safe-harbor loopholes as ways to limit accountants' professional obligations and their resulting exposure to civil and criminal penalties. Corporate fraud, bribery, and illegal-gratuity statutes limit this exposure even further by setting hard-to-prove standards for punishing deceitful reporting. Prosecutors must establish a motivational link between the benefits managers and accountants may exchange and the particular actions or decisions that generated them. Because clever lawyers can always invent innocent rationalizations for accepting and delivering favors, the burden of proof is inordinately heavy. To establish a corrupt motive requires either that the accused stupidly fail to destroy highly incriminating records that investigators capture by subpoena or for a third-party whistleblower to step up with irrefutable evidence of the illegal nature of the transaction.
The survival of safe-harbor loopholes and the difficulty of proving auditor malfeasance testify to the effectiveness of the accounting lobby and the strength of the incentive conflicts it transmits to members of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). Ironically the profession's repeated success in limiting its worst members' exposure to legal penalties has cumulatively undermined its authority and prestige.
Sooner or later, the practical ethics of the accounting profession must make its members embrace more fully their common-law duty of assuring the economic meaningfulness of the income and net-worth figures their clients publish.
I. Role of Watchdog Institutions in Corporate Governance
Systems of corporate governance reinforce and make explicit common-law duties of loyalty, competence, and care that a firm's board and top managers implicitly owe to other parties. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) hypothesize that executives routinely use their power over the appointment and reappointment of corporate directors to extract rents from other stakeholders. They show that this hypothesis can explain the stubborn survival of practices and patterns of executive compensation that Pareto-efficient bargaining ought long ago to have relegated to the dustbin.
less-informed stakeholders. The strength of this temptation varies with internal and external controls which determine the costs and expected durability of efforts to distort information flows.
A firm's internal incentive system can be termed "evenhanded" or "impartial" if it minimizes temptations for its employees (including so-called independent directors) to engage in inefficient, dishonest, or exploitive behavior. Agency theory transforms this ethical criterion into an efficiency condition based on the proposition that "counterparties have incentives to reduce or control conflicts of interest so as to reduce the losses these conflicts engender [and] …then share the gains" (Jensen, 1994 
When disinformation is building up or decaying, short-horizon returns would correlate positively. However, disinformational effects would be reversed over longer periods.
As Figure 1 illustrates, watchdog institutions are supposed to help outside investors to filter corporate disinformation out of their information sets. However, watchdogs may deliberately or inadvertently certify false or misleading statements.
Individuals can counter the effects of disinformation in three ways: by directly acquiring incremental information for themselves through reading and research, by relying on professional information specialists for incremental intelligence, and by reaching out for help from law-enforcement officials and legislators when evidence of fraud surfaces.
Whenever a contract is initiated or renewed, every party to which the contract assigns an informational risk has an incentive to sort through and correct the information flowing from incentive-conflicted sources. The strength of this incentive can be measured by the difference between the marginal benefits of challenging potential disinformation and the marginal costs of the ex ante and ex post effort it takes to mount this challenge.
We assume that the marginal cost of acquiring inside information declines as it ages. Unfavorable information on any party k that is uncovered by any one of its counterparties leaks out after a lag to other interested parties. As more parties acquire the information, the number of routes through which it can be obtained rises. The juicier the 8 information is, the quicker it spreads as rumor on the gossip mill. Recent rumors are captured, investigated, and (if verified) disseminated at a cost by the professional information industry. Eventually, verified information becomes common knowledge that almost anyone can verify at virtually zero cost. This diffusion process implies that, in any country, the value of disinformation to the disinformer tends to decay over time and may be subject to sudden, discrete drops. The value of disinformation to insiders will decay at a faster rate, the more cheaply and more reliably timely information is collected and distributed by information specialists.
Incentive support for disinformational activity comes from forms of compensation -such as short-dated stock options -that allow insiders to profit disproportionately from artificially boosting measures of short-term performance. Such front-loaded contracts tempt insiders to believe that they can realize gains while w i (D) is high and plan either to exit the firm before the truth emerges or to set aside a portion of their ill-gotten proceeds to employ high-powered legal assistance to trivialize whatever penalties they may ultimately have to suffer.
It would be naive to presume that in all circumstances information specialists seek only to curtail the effects of insider disinformation. Incentive conflicts exist in the information industry, too. Disinformers often put political or economic pressure on information specialists to enlist their help in concealing or misrepresenting unfavorable information. Users of information must always allow for the possibility that a particular specialist may be innocently, negligently, or even corruptly making disinformation more credible.
It is convenient to model the direct effects on contract valuation of external private and governmental information production as multiplying w i (D) by a nonnegative factor b i that is produced at social cost c i . If disinformation could be easily refuted, b i and c i would be near zero. The degree of transparency T i that the particular contract i can offer its users increases the lower is b i , the more cheaply counterinformation can be produced, and the larger the expected present value of the pain P i that procedures for enforcing legal and reputational penalties visit upon insiders who misrepresent the contract's value. Transparency can be defined as a function of the three variables just mentioned:
. This suggests that empirical researchers could proxy unobservable differences in transparency either across time or across countries by observable measures or potential correlates of these three determinants.
The more transparency an information system displays, the more successfully outside monitoring and penalties for issuing false and inadequate disclosures can mitigate the potential harm that disinformational activity might introduce. If b i =0, the information industry renders disinformation about the particular contract i perfectly ineffective. As b i approaches 1 from below, the financial counterinformation industry becomes progressively less helpful to outside stakeholders. If b i exceeds 1, on balance the information industry produces more disinformation about contract i than it dispels.
To allow for countervailing economic information that accumulates freely with the mere passage of time, we introduce a time subscript (t) and define freely available economic counter-information on contract i (E ti ) as follows:
where e ji equals the incremental amount of publicly available counter-information on contract i that surfaces at date j. Using definition (2) and introducing time and the present value of the expected pain a disinformer faces for admitting error or perverting the truth, (1) becomes:
Issuers of securities have incentives to release favorable inside information promptly, but to conceal or distort the meaning of adverse events as they occur. This asymmetry implies unfavorable information tends to accumulate before its release, so that
[as Bakshi and Madan (1998) 
Society may reasonably prefer that refutational checks on disinformational activity be produced by overlapping private and governmental entities. In part, this is because both government and private suppliers are bound to be offered inducements to underproduce informational discipline. At the same time, efforts to strengthen truthtelling incentives benefit parties that cannot easily be made to pay information suppliers for producing them. Producers of external benefits can seldom collect fair compensation without invoking the enforcement and dispute-resolution powers of the state. The existence of uncompensated externalities in watchdog activities makes it easier for corporate insiders to influence information agents and suggests that neither governmental nor private cooperative entities should dominate the process of developing and enforcing disclosure standards. In the U.S., joint public-private regulation is in fact the norm for financial firms. Federal and state agencies importantly supplement private accounting and credit-rating watchdogs in formulating and enforcing disclosure standards. These agencies seek to cover the costs of their activities through fees, taxes, fines, and civil lawsuits.
The social value of information flows S t may be expressed as the sum of informational benefits produced in the private sector (S Pt ) and in government (S Gt ):
The net value of information flows to society S t N   is less than this sum by the cost of the resources the two production processes absorb:
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If conflicts of interest and externalities did not exist in the financial information industry, market forces would produce the socially optimal amount of information.
Information suppliers would maximize enterprise profits and social welfare by driving the net marginal value of undisclosed information to zero in their sector.
A weaker benchmark for optimality may be developed by assuming that conflicts of interest between bureaucrats and taxpayers could be reduced to negligible proportions by the intermediation of a diligent and free press if we could establish perfect accountability for decisions made in the government sector. In this case, citizens might search more energetically for effective ways to motivate public servants to direct their informational interventions to finding and correcting deficiencies in private-sector information production. Successful interventions would seek to lessen the incentive conflicts facing accountants, credit-rating agencies, and other private watchdogs, thereby curtailing management opportunities to hide material adverse information and to engage in prolonged campaigns of deceit.
III. Ethical Standards of Information Production
Good decisionmaking requires hard-to-gather information. So does responsible oversight of whatever decisions are made. The fundamental dilemma of corporate and public governance is that, at the margin and over short periods, it often pays to hide adverse information. The result is that an ethician could say that outside stakeholders deserve more complete accountability than can be fashioned from the ethical standards that insiders set and the gaps in the information flows outsiders receive. Hard-to-resolve conflicts exist between limits set by principled and practical standards of behavior. These conflicts allow a corporate manager or information agent to define its duties self-interestedly by drawing opportunistically from conflicting systems of business and governmental ethical standards (Jacobs, 1992) . It is convenient to label the duties implied by abstract or principled standards as ethics one and the often-looser obligations imposed by practical standards that hold sway in subcultures as ethics two.
Ethics one are hypothetical rules and values that --in a given society--you and I would prefer that others would accept as governing right and wrong when they are faced with a given conflict in interest. Ethics two are the rules and values that we would accept as constraining ourselves if we would actually be presented with the same situation. This distinction may also be framed as "rules for others" and "rules for ourselves." The Judaeo-Christian Golden Rule acknowledges this duality and advises us to do unto others as we would have them do unto us. The rule defines a right conscience as one that would make managers' "ethics two" rules identical with those of their "ethics one."
As a guide to forming a right conscience in working life, the reciprocity criterion dictated by the Golden Rule tells individuals how they can clean up incentive conflict.
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The Golden Rule offers a way to make principled choices of behaviors from diverse ethical guidelines. Although the standard for determining a clean conscience is permitted to be idiosyncratic, the Rule's adherents have no reason to fear informational transparency. This is because individuals are led to behave as if every action they might be able to cover up and every motive they might be able to misrepresent will eventually be seen through and exposed to everyone they harm. The Rule requires individuals to admit mistakes quickly, to compensate individuals for the harm caused, and to make a firm purpose of amendment. However, it is only a counsel of perfection. To gather incentive force, it must be supplemented by a substantial fear of private dishonor, public shame, or divine retribution. Where none of these fears is substantial, civil and criminal penalties carry an inevitably more selective burden of enforcement.
IV. Dialectics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The U.S. Congress may be conceived as an arena in which lobbyists for diverse interests battle endlessly with one another. The outcome of every important battle is a temporary and loophole-ridden peace treaty. To understand the latest treaty and why it must eventually break down, one must understand the weaknesses that undermined the treaty it replaces. One must also understand the objectives, strategies, and relative strength of the different lobbies.
It is no accident that, in the modern U.S., incentive conflict in information production is controlled imperfectly. A strong lobby prefers loophole-ridden codes of ethics and poorly enforced structural checks and balances (Zeff, 2002) . Opposing lobbies have pressed for stricter liability laws and broad disclosure standards. (2) to avoid criticizing the ways that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) established by FASB limit the effectiveness of GAAS.
Moreover, it will seem expedient to do these things, even though safe-harbor loopholes inherent in GAAP and GAAS lie at the root of the most-outrageous corporate scandals of recent history.
These principles and standards undermine practicing accountants' moral duty to promote transparency. Requiring auditors to certify only that a corporation's reports conform with GAAP circumvents the Golden Rule issue of investigating and certifying whether the reports truly and fairly reflect economic reality (see Wolnizer, 1987) . Until and unless the PCAOB refocuses the auditing process on authenticating the economic meaningfulness of income and net-worth calculations, the bluntness of this prong will reduce the penetrating power of the other two.
V. Asymmetric Ethical Treatment of the Accounting Industry
Around the world, accounting professionals have traditionally softened the edges of accounting and litigation reform legislation (Zeff, 2002) . Despite evidence of favoritism toward the accounting industry strong enough to force his resignation, former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt managed to stay in office as a lame duck long enough to oversee the precedent-setting first stages of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's followup process.
As a result, the legislative response to investor dissatisfaction with inherited accounting standards and disclosure incentives was rechanneled back through the same incentiveconflicted professionals who had served society so badly in the first place. To strengthen surviving weak links in the chain of corporate governance and information control, aggrieved parties must continue to rely on an all-too-partisan SEC.
This demonstrates the strength of the accounting lobby. Its ability to exert political pressure testifies ultimately to the size of the rents that this highly concentrated industry can obtain by preserving its options to help troubled firms and rogue managers to conceal adverse information from outside stakeholders. Roberts, Dwyer, And Sweeney (2003) disaggregate the profession's clout into three parts: the size of the lobbying staff it maintains in Washington, DC; its capacity to generate information and research with which to build support for its legislative interests;
and the financial resources it can contribute to the members of House and Senate committees that have primary jurisdiction over accounting issues.
For each of the biennal election cycles of 1988-1996, Table 1 Accountants (AICPA) and the largest accounting firms . Cox (2003, p. 24) reports that the industry went on to spend another $41 million on lobbying activity during 1997-2001.
The substantial upward trend these figures reveal suggests that industry clout has grown greatly in recent years. Table 2 compares accountants' clout with that of other financial lobbies.
Measuring lobbying strength by the dues revenue available to be channeled into lobbying activity each year by industry trade associations, the table indicates that accountants have a political warchest that makes the banking, securities, and insurance industries look poorly armed.
In his 1820 essay "On Government," James Mill opined: "All of the difficult questions of government relate to the means of restraining those, in whose hands are lodged the powers necessary for the protection of all, from making bad use of it." A principal protective mission of the SEC is to safeguard investors and the integrity of U.S.
securities markets from corporate disinformation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act empowers the SEC to make it harder and more dangerous for managers to overstate revenues, understate expenses, and make deceptive use of reserve accounts. How fully the SEC proceeds to use its enhanced power is less a matter of principle than of politics. And so is how well or poorly the SEC has policed accounting standards in the past. suggests --but does not prove --that it may be overly scrupulous.
Across the chain of information production, SEC rulemaking has imposed vastly stronger Golden Rule obligations on investment analysts and corporate insiders than on the accounting profession. Top corporate officials are now obliged to report material events promptly and fully. Management must provide information that it believes is necessary for an understanding of its off-balance-sheet arrangements and quantitatively reconcile presentations of so-called "pro forma" information with comparable measures prepared according to GAAP. Attorneys representing public companies must report evidence of material violations of laws or duties to a firm's CEO, chief legal officer, or board. Mutual-fund managers must publicly disclose how they vote their proxies.
Investment analysts must certify that opinions expressed in research reports accurately reflect their personal views and explain any specific payments that may have influenced their research. Because the informational benefits and costs of these provisions were not specifically estimated and weighed quantitatively by the SEC, one must expect these issues to be revisited by spokespersons for the obliged parties as data on their compliance burdens accumulate.
In the absence of data on the costs and benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley obligations impose on particular information agents, it is illogical for SEC commissioners to distrust the ethics of corporate insiders, outside financial analysts, and mutual-fund managers so severely while continuing to rely heavily on professional accountants to behave conscientiously. Making the top officers of auditing firms responsible for seeing that underlings review by statistical methods the overall economic accuracy of the numbers their firms certify and for explaining how specific payments might have influenced their opinions would impose enforceable obligations parallel to those placed on other parties in the information chain. Committee policies and procedures for preapproval rather than requiring the specific and explicit approval of the Audit Committee as envisioned in the Act. This rule places the burden of assuring that client-auditor arrangements comply with the Act on a public company's Audit Committee and lets the accounting firm off the hook.
In a further effort to assure formal auditor independence, the Act also calls for firms to rotate their auditors every few years. Final SEC rules on auditor rotation softened the burden of this provision. SEC rules require only that particular categories of audit partners leave a company's auditing team after five or seven years. However, the continuity of the team as a whole is not explicitly regulated.
The gaps in these rules entitle auditing firms to collect laundered bribes from dishonest or desperate managers for knowingly and willingly certifying disinformational reports without squarely exposing themselves to the explicit obligations and penalties that the corporate managers face themselves. To dream up a parallel situation in criminal law, one might imagine a penal code that exempted lookouts and drivers of getaway cars from penalties for participating in armed robbery.
VI. Concluding Comments
The strategy of relying on the personal honor, professional ethics, and reputational risk aversion of watchdogs to refute dishonest reporting has failed dramatically. When it comes to financial reporting, investors seem increasingly more likely to be shocked by honesty than appalled by deceit.
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Although observers such as the Financial Economists Roundtable (2002) attribute the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to a three-way crisis in accounting, auditing, and corporate governance, follow-up rulemaking by the SEC has focused disproportionately on strengthening the corporate Audit-Committee and governance links in the informational chain. The SEC has exempted the self-interested ethical codes of the auditing industry and accounting profession from the actionable obligation to affirm the economic accuracy of audited reports that the Act imposed on the other information producers and might symmetrically have imposed on informational watchdogs as well.
That accountants could preserve such asymmetric privileges underscores how difficult it is for Congress and the SEC to address even blatant market failure. Like basketball referees, accountants' first obligation should be to the integrity of the game, not to the players and especially not to the particular persons who happen to pay their per-game expenses and fees. That the auditing and credit-rating industries have each become so highly concentrated is consistent with Akerlof's (1970) model of how opportunistic behavior might push principled behavior increasingly out of watchdog markets. It is hard to resist the hypothesis that scrupulously honest accountants and managers might be looking for opportunities to differentiate themselves from lessconscientious colleagues. If so, to reregulate accountants' incentives may require --not just a first-class PCAOB and more energetic SEC rulemaking and enforcement -but a concerted effort by other sectors to reduce industry rents by encouraging new entry into the extraordinarily concentrated accounting and credit-rating industries.
Source: Roberts, Dwyer, and Sweeney (2003) , assembled by FECInfo, Inc. from Federal Election Commission reports. Individual CPAs also made personal contributions during each election cycle. 
